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Abstract
In this paper, I investigate more closely the contribution of modal operators to the se-
mantics of comparatives and I show that there is no need for a maximality or minimality
operator. Following Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) analysis of modal elements, I assume that the
meaning of a modal sentence is dependent on a conversational background and an ordering
source. For comparative environments, I demonstrate that the ordering source reduces a set
of possibledegrees to a single degree that is most (or least) wanted or expected, i.e., maxi-
mality and minimality readings of comparative constructionsare an effect of the pragmatic
meaning of the modal.
1 Introduction
A maximality or minimality operator is an essential component of the meaning of comparative
constructions in many recent analyses (von Stechow 1984, Rullmann 1995, Kennedy 1999,
Heim 2001). Russell (1905), however, had in mind a much simpler analysis of comparative
constructions.
Russell proposed for comparative sentences, as in (1-a), an analysis in terms of a comparison
of deﬁnite descriptions of degrees, as in (1-b). This view presupposes an exactly-reading for
the degree variable. That is, “Mary is d-tall” abbreviates that Mary has exactly the degree d on
the tallness scale. In the at least-reading for the degree variable the uniqueness presuppositions
would not be satisﬁed.
(1) a. Mary is taller than John (is).
b. [the d:M a r yi sd-tall] > [the d: John is d-tall]
In analogy, we might assume an analysis in terms of deﬁnite descriptions for constructions
with less, as well. Whereas the positive comparative morphemes more and -er introduce a
greater than-relation between two degrees, the negative comparative morpheme less introduces
a smaller than-relation.
(2) a. John is less tall than Mary (is).
b. [the d: John is d-tall] < [the d:M a r yi sd-tall]
￿Part of this reserach was presented in the Semantics Reading Group SURGE at Rutgers in 2000, at “Sinn
und Bedeutung” (2001) held at the University of Osnabrück, in the linguistics colloquium at the University of
Tübingen 2001, and at the 13th Amsterdam Colloquium. I wouldliketo thank the participants of all these talks for
helpfulcomments, interestingquestionsand encouragement. Special thanksgo tomy teacher and friendArnimvon
Stechow for preventing me from making really horriﬁc mistakes and to Ede Zimmermann who commented on an
earlier versionofthispaper. Allremainingmistakes aremy own. Moreover, I am indebtedtoElena Guerzoni,Irene
Heim, Winnie Lechner, Uli Sauerland, Roger Schwarzschild, Yael Sharvit and Karina Wilkinson for stimulating
discussions.
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Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Gesellschaft für Semantik, University of OsnabrückThis simple approach is, however, problematic. There are several arguments that show that an
analysis in termsofdeﬁnitedescriptionsdoesnot makethecorrect predictions. They all concern
constructions with a (existential or universal) quantiﬁer in the than-clause. One group of critical
constructions contains one of the following elements in the than-clause: (1) modal can,( 2 )t h e
determiner NPI any, (3) the adverbial NPI ever or (4) the connective or: see von Stechow 1984.
The denotation of all these elements may be capture by existential quantiﬁcation. The other
group of critical examples contains universal quantiﬁers expressing modality.
In this paper, I will concentrate on modal elements with existential and universal force.
To begin, I recapitulate the motivations for the introduction of a maximality or minimality op-
erator and the arguments for an at least-reading of the degree variable. These amendments of
the simple analysis known from the literature, however, will be shown not to be sufﬁcient to
explain two kinds of examples: (a) minimality readings of constructions with a modal denoting
possibility and (b) maximality readings of constructions with a modal denoting necessity.
Then, I will argue that the problematic examples may easily be explained by an amendmend
of the semantics of the modal expression in the sense of Kratzer’s doubly relative modality:
see Kratzer (1981, 1990). Interestingly, the motivation for the introduction of a maximality
operator or minimality operator (in the exactly-reading of the degree variable) disappear as well
as the motivation for the at least-reading. For comparative environments, we demonstrate that
the ordering source reduces a set of admissible degrees to a single degree that is most (or least)
wanted or expected.
Wemighttakethisresultasevidencefortheconclusion thatasimpleanalysis intermsofdeﬁnite
descriptions (the Russellian view) is adequate for comparative constructions. But as long as we
do not have an explanation for the minimality/maximality effects in constructions with NPIs
and or we are not entitled to draw this conclusion. I leave the analysis of these constructions to
further research.
2 Previous analyses
2.1 Existentials
Consider an example with a modal can in a ﬁrst step, as in (3-a). This modal is interpreted as an
existential quantiﬁer over worlds. A representation in terms of deﬁnite descriptions as in (3-b)
carries a uniqueness presupposition and therefore is only deﬁned if Bill runs equally fast in all
accessible worlds, otherwise it is not deﬁned.1
(3) a. Jim was running faster than Bill can run.
b. [the d: Jim is d-fast] > [the d:
9w[Acc(w) & Bill is d-fast in w]]
This prediction is however intuitively not correct. Bill could run with a different speed in dif-
ferent accessible worldsand (3-a) may still be true. In fact, it seems that (3-a) is true if Jim runs
faster than Bill’s highest possible speed. A representation, as in (4), is deﬁned in such a sce-
nario. Here, the standard of comparsion, i.e., the second argument of the greater than-relation,
is the maximal degree of a set of degrees that satisfy the than-clause.
1Acc(w) abbreviates the accessibility relation for w.W h e t h e rw is accessible depends essentially on the kind of
modality that is contextually salient.
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fd:
9w[Acc(w) & Bill is d-fast in w]
g
Analogously, we may argue for cases with ever and any. Ever is usually interpreted as an
existential quantiﬁer over time intervals. Consider the sentence in (5-a). Most certainly, the
temperaturevaried in the past, and the sentence is trueif it was hotter yesterday than the highest
degree measured in the past. This intuition may be captured by maximalizing the set of degrees
that satisfy the than-clause, as in (5-b). Again, an interpretationin terms of deﬁnite desctiptions
would not be deﬁned.
(5) a. Yesterday, it was hotter than it ever was before.
b. [the d:i tw a sd-hot yesterday] > MAX
fd :
9t[t < YESTERDAY & it is d-hot at t]
g
NPI-any is interpreted as an existential quantiﬁer over individuals. Again, this sentence is cap-
tured correctly if we introducemaximality in the semantics of the comparative,as in (6-b). (6-a)
is true if Ede is cleverer than thecleverest person. The representation in terms of Russellian def-
inite description predicts the sentence to be undeﬁned, contrary to intuitions.
(6) a. Ede is cleverer than anyone of us.
b. [the d:Ei sd-clever] > MAX
fd:
9x[one_of_us(x)&x is d-clever]
g
And, we encounter a similar problem if or is interpreted as a boolean connective with narrow
scope. Consider the sentence in (7-a). If Aspen differs from Vail with respect to niceness the
sentence is true if Breckenridge is nicer than the nicest of the two other cities. (7-b) expresses
this intuition by means of a maximality operator.
(7) a. It is nicer in Breckenridge than it is in Vail or Aspen.
b. [the d:i ti sd-nice in B.] > MAX
fd:i ti sd-nice in V.
_ it is d-nice in A.]
g
The interested reader, I refer to the work by von Stechow (1984a).
So far, we only discussed constructions with more/-er with a maximality reading. Rullmann
(1995) challenges the view that the second argument of the comparison is uniformly a maximal
degree of a set of degrees: Less-comparatives may have a minimality reading, as is illustrated
in (8).
(8) Students live on less money than a professor could live on.
(8) means that the amount of money that students usually live on is smaller than the minimal
amount of money such that a professor could live on it. The correct representation seems to be
one with a minimality operator instead of a maximality operator, as in (9).
(9) [the d: students live on d-much money] < MIN
fd:
9w[Acc(w) & a professor lives on
d-much money in w]
g
Not only constructions with modals show this minimality effect. Analogously, constructions
with NPIs and or seem to call for a minimality reading. In (10) we are comparing my bicycle
to the least expensive of all the cars.
(10) a. My bicycle was less expensive than any car.
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fd:
9x[car(x)&x is d-expensive]
g
A representation with a maximality operator would make counterintuitive predictions and a
variant with a deﬁnite description would not be deﬁned.
In (11-a) Jim’s shortest jump ever is compared to the length of his actual jump. Again, this
paraphrase seems to call for a minimality reading as in (11-b).
(11) a. Yesterday, Jim jumped less far than he ever jumped before.
b. [the d: Jim jumped d-far yesterday] <
MIN
fd :
9t[t < YESTERDAY & Jim jumped d-far at t]
g
All these examples are problematic for the simple analysis in terms of deﬁnite descriptions and
we may easily capture the minimality readings with the introduction of a minimality operator
that operates on the set of degrees that satisfy a restriction imposed by the than-clause. This
solution however necessitates the exactly- interpretation for the degree variable: see Rullmann
1995:77, footnote 33.
Modal existential quantiﬁers and negative polarity items denoting existentials seem to differ
with respect to one aspect. Whereas less-constructions with any, ever are restricted obligatorily
to a minimality reading, we may also observe maximality readings with constructions with
modals.
Rullmann discusses the example in (12-a) among others. (12-a) means that the highest amount
that professors can spend exceeds the amount that students usually spend. And, we are tempted
to capture this meaning by the introduction of a maximality operator, as in (12-b).
(12) a. Students spend less money than a professor can spend.
b. [the d: students spend d-much money] < MAX
fd:
9w[Acc(w) & a professor
spends d-much money in w]
g
Rullmann locates the ambiguity of modalized constructions with less in the denotation of less
itself and proposes that less is (lexically) ambiguous between a maximality and a minimality
reading.2
Constructions with an NP disjunction in the than-clause are possibly ambiguous between an
minimality and a maximality reading. But my intuitions are not so clear. Consider (13).
(13) a. Jim is less tall than Tim or Toby.
b. [the d: Jim is d-tall] < MIN
fd: Tim is d-tall
_ Toby is d-tall
g
This sentence might be true if Jim is shorter than both of the others (minimality reading) or if
he is shorter than the taller one of Tim and Toby. Rullmann predicts an ambiguity.
So far, we considered only comparatives with an existential quantiﬁer in the than-clause. It was
shown that the Russellian approach in terms of deﬁnite descriptions is problematic for modal
expressions. Furthermore, we discussed two alternative analyses, one for constructions with
-er/more involving maximalization and one for less involving minimalization. In a next step we
2In his dissertation he also discusses a variant where he assumes lexical decomposition of less in a comparative
meaning component -er and a adjectival component little: see also Heim n.d. for a split-scope account of less-
comparatives.
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2.2 Universals
Modals denoting necessity reveal another problem with the simple analysis. Assume that Mary
wants to get from A to B in at most one hour. In order to get to B she has to drive with at least
140 km/h. Now, consider the sentence in (14) in this scenario. This sentence has intuitively
a minimality reading. The sentence is true in the given scenario if Mary is driving faster than
the lowest admissible speed, i.e. 140 km/h. If we translate necessary by a universal quantiﬁer
over worlds, it turns out that the formulas in (14-a-c) are only deﬁned if Mary has one and the
same speed in all accessible worlds. In our scenario, therefore, the sentence in (14) would not
be deﬁned contrary to our intuitions. This outcome, however, hinges on the assumption that we
have an exactly-interpretation for the degree variable d in the representations.
(14) Mary is driving faster than necessary.
a. [the d: M. is driving d-fast] > [the d:
8w
[Acc
(w
)
) M. is driving d-fast in w
]
g]
b. [the d: M. is driving d-fast] > MIN
fd:
8w
[Acc
(w
)
) M. is driving d-fast in w
]
g
c. [the d: M. is driving d-fast] > MAX
fd:
8w
[Acc
(w
)
) M. is driving d-fast in w
]
g
Ifwegiveup theexactly-interpretationin favorof anatleast-interpretation,therepresentationin
(14-c) makes the correct predictions. Heim (2001:216) proposes an analysis for comparatives
that has the effect of an “at least” interpretation for the degree variable. The maximal speed
such that Mary has it in all accessible worlds is the minimally permitted speed. If we pursue the
at least-interpretation we have to watch out for a different explanation for constructions with
less with a minimality reading (see above). A minimality operator would give us uniformly
the minimal element of the scale in the cases considered so far. Heim n.d. proposed a detailed
alternativeanalysis forless in adifferentaccountwith anat least-readingforthedegreevariable.
In what follows, I discuss two examples which show that the accounts discussed so far run into
problems: (a) comparatives with a minimality reading and a modal denoting possibility in the
than-clause and (b) comparatives with a maximality reading and a modal denoting necessity in
the than-clause.
2.3 Two problematic cases
Imagine the following scenario. Chuck is driving a truck full of eggs on a New Jersey highway.
It is true that the slower Chuck drives the less eggs break. Moreover, Chuck wants to bring as
many eggs as possible to their ﬁnal destination and he does not want to risk a speeding ticket.
The road trafﬁc regulations limit the minimum speed on New Jersey highways to 45 mph and
the maximum speed to 65 mph. All in all, it seems desirable that Chuck is driving as slow as
possible within the regulations. In this scenario, the sentence in (15) might be true if Chuck is
driving with 56 mph, i.e. faster than 45 mph but slower than 65 mph. Such a reading, I will call
a more-than-minimumreading.
(15) Chuck is driving faster than he is allowed to drive.
A representation in terms of deﬁnite descriptions of degrees would not make the correct predic-
tions since the speed in the regulation worlds may vary. But, the repair strategy by introduction
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(16) [the d: Chuck is d-fast] > MAX
fd:
9w
[Acc
(w
) & Chuck is d-fast in w]
g
In the accessible worldsno violations of the law in the actual world occur. Thereforeeverybody
is driving with a speed between 45 and 65 mph. The maximal permitted speed is 65 mph. We
predict (16) to be true only if Chuck is driving faster than 65 mph. This reading is possible but
not intended in the above mentioned scenario of Chuck the egg truck driver. Consequently, we
predict (16) to be false if Chuck is driving 56 mph, contrary to the intuition.
Note that this outcome is not an effect of the exactly-interpretation or the at least-interpretation
of the degree variable. Both versions make the same predictions in this case.
There are two possible ways out of this situation. Either we follow Rullmann’s strategy for less
and assume that more/-er are ambiguous, as well.3
Or we locate the unexpected reading in the denotation of the modal elements and not in the
denotation of the comparative morphemes. I will pursue the second approach.
Modals denoting necessity show a similar behaviour. They can not only trigger a more-than-
minimum reading but also a more-than-maximum reading. We already discussed an example
with a more-than-minimumreading: see above.
A more-than-maximum reading is preferred if we assume a situation where John applies for a
job in an asylum for the elderly. In order to get the job he has to be friendly but not too friendly.
Unfortunately he didn’t get the job because of the fact in (17).4
(17) He was more helpful than he should have been.
(17) means that John’s helpfulness exceeds the maximally admissible helpfulness. A repre-
sentation as in (18) cannot express this meaning neither in the at least- nor in the exactly-
interpretation of the degree variable. In the at least-interpretation the sentence is predicted to
have only a more-than-minimum reading. And in the exactly-interpretation the sentence is not
deﬁned in the given scenario.
(18) [the d:J .w a sd-helpful] > MAX
fd:
8w
[Acc
(w
)
) J. was d-helpful in w]
g
In general, it seems to be possible that constructions with can, could and be allowed to (pos-
sibility operators), but also constructions with should, must and have to (necessity operators)
allow ambiguities with respect to the characteristics of the standard of comparison. Further
investigation has to reveal whether there are lexical restrictions with respect to the use of the
modals.
An analysis in the spirit of von Stechowwith anexactly-interpretationof thedegree variablehas
difﬁculties to predict the available readings in several cases: comparative constructions with an
3Rullmann (1995:95) himself rejects that constructions with more/-er in combination with a positive polar
adjective are ambiguous between a more-than-minimum and a more-than-maximum reading. But he mentionnes
constructions with negative polar adjectives that allow an ambiguity withoutgivingan explanation.
(i) The helicopter was ﬂying lower than a plane can ﬂy.
4This example is adapted from Rullmann (1995:80). Rullmann does not consider that examples of this kind
(with a modal denoting necessity) in the than-clause are not deﬁned under his own approach.
280embedded necessity operator are undeﬁned in an exactly-interpretation of the degree variable if
the relevant degrees vary in the accessible worlds. An analysis with an at least-interpretation
does slightly better since it explains the more-than-minimum readings of constructions with
a necessity operator and the more-than-maximum readings of constructions with a possibility
operator. The interpretation of constructions with universal modals, therefore, seems to call
for an at least-interpretation of the degree variable. The at least- interpretation of the degree
variable is, however, not compatible with an account involving a minimality operator.
But, no version can predict the more-than-minimumreading in constructions with an embedded
possibility operator and the more-than-maximum reading in constructions with an embedded
necessity operator.5 How could we ﬁx these problems?
As far as constructions with modals are concerned, I will approach this question as follows: I
will proposearepairstrategy inorder to derivethecorrect readings. Thisrepair strategy consists
essentially in a revision of the semantics of the modals. Instead of interpreting them only with
respect to some accessibilty relation, I am interpreting modal elements dependent on a modal
base and an ordering source. If we do that, the maximality operator or minimality operator in
the classical analysis of comparatives becomes obsolete. Maximality and minimality readings
depend on the kind of ordering source salient in the context. To begin, I am working with an
approach to comparsion with two maximality operators. And, I show that the set of degrees that
the maximality operator in the standard of comparison is applying to is always a singleton (in
the exactly-interpretation of the degree variable) if the than-clause is modalized.
3 Theoretical assumptions
3.1 Comparative
In order to interpret comparative constructions, I am using a version of a degree-quantiﬁer
analysis. Comparatives are relations between sets of degrees. I assume that the comparative
morphemes -er, more,a n dless respectively, are quantiﬁers that relate two sets of degrees where
one set satisﬁes the requirements imposed by the than-clause (Q) and one set satisﬁes the re-
quirements imposed by the matrix (P). Negative polar adjectives induce an order reversal.
(19) [[-er/more]]
= λQ<d,t>λP<d,t>MAX
fd : P
(d
)
=1
g >M A X
fd* : Q
(d*
)
=1
g
(20) [[less]]
= λQ<d,t>λP<d,t>MAX
fd : P
(d
)
=1
g <M A X
fd* : Q
(d*
)
=1
g
3.2 Modality
In the framework developed in Kratzer (1981), the interpretation of modal elements does not
only depend on (a) the kind of modal relation (i.e. possibility and necessity) and (b) information
that characterizes the accessibility relation but also (c) on an ordering source that induces an
ordering on the accessible worlds: see also Kratzer (1991) for arguments for doubly relative
modality.
I adopt the deﬁnitions in (21) and (22). Modals are interpreted with respect to an accessibility
relation (Acc) and an ordering (
￿). Both parameters aresupplied contextually. Modals denoting
5It is however a fact that minimalityreadings are indeed preferred over maximality readings with necessity op-
erators and maximality readings are preferred over minimalityreadings in construction with possibilityoperators.
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allowed to etc. have existential force. Accessibility and ordering restrict the quantiﬁcational
domain of the quantiﬁers.
(21) [[NEC]] = λwλp
8w’
[w’
2Acc
(w
) &
:
[
9w*
2Acc
(w
) & w*<ww’
]
) p
(w’
)
=1
]
(22) [[POSS]] = λwλp
9w’
[w’
2Acc
(w
) &
:
[
9w*
2Acc
(w
) & w*<ww’
] & p
(w’
)
=1
]
The versions differ from Kratzer’s original version of human necessity and human possiblity
in two respects. I assume simplifying that there is a world that comes maximally close to the
worldw. And, ordering sources have originally a more complex form than in this version. I will
come back to this point.
Consider the interpretation of the sentences that were problematic for the analyses considered
so far under the new perspective where we interpret the modals doubly relative.
4 Sample applications
I am going to show that it is possible to derive three relevant cases:
(23) a. Less + possibility with a minimality reading
b. More/-er + possibility with a minimality reading
c. More/-er + necessity with a maximality reading
Recall that case (a) was problematic because it motivated the minimality operator. But a mini-
mality operator was shown not to be compatible with at least-readings for the degree variable.
The at least-readings on the other hand were shown to be requisite for more-than-minimum
readings of a construction with a modal denoting necessity. The cases (b) and (c) are still unex-
plained in the literature so far.
4.1 Less + possibility
An example as in (24) might be uttered in a situation where a jet ﬁghter is trying to chase a
helicopter. And the helicopter escaped the jet ﬁghter by hiding below a bridge. One reason
the helicopter could escape may be (24). (Once more, the example is adapted from Rullmann
1995.)
(24) The helicopter was ﬂying less high than a jet ﬁghter can ﬂy.
(24) is true if the helicopter is ﬂying below the minimal height possible for the jet. The accessi-
bility relation, I take to pick worlds that conform to the dispositions of jet ﬁghters. Assume for
convenience that causal laws determine that jet ﬁghters ﬂy at a height between 60 and 10’000
meters. Worldswhereajet isﬂyingloweror higherdo not conformtothecausal laws. Formally,
we might capture the set of accessible worlds as in (25).
(25)
8w: Acc
(w
)
￿
f w*:
8d
8x
[
[xis a jet-ﬁghterin w*& x ﬂies d-highin w*]
) 60m
￿d
￿
10km
]
g
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worlds where the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying lowest. This would explain the minimality reading of the
sentence in (24). In other words, accessible worlds where the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying lowest (= with
a height of 60 meters above the ground) come closest to the ideal. But why should a world w’
where the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying with a height of 60 meters be prefered to a world w”w h e r eh ei s
ﬂying at a higher height?
Let us assume that the pilot of the jet ﬁghter wants to ﬂy at a height of at most 35 meters. This
wish could be a consequence of the pilot’s commission to ﬁght the helicopter and the helicopter
is hiding below a bridge that has a height of 40 meters. The wish of the jet pilot determines a
set of propositions as in (26).
(26) A =
fp :
9n
[0<n
￿ 35 meters & p
= the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying at a height of at most n
meters]
g
No accessible world may make this wish true. Thus, it is not possible to establish an order on
the accessible worlds with this set of propositions. But, ‘what is wanted’ (A) determines a set
of relevant propositions that are not wanted ( ¯ A).6 Note that the set ¯ A is equivalent to the set
f
:p : p
2 A
g.S o ,¯ A is not the complement of A, as could be implied by the notation. In our
case these are propositions that are implied by the fact that the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying with at least
35 meters, as in (27).
(27) ¯ A =
fp :
9n
[35 < n
￿ ∞ meters & p
= the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying at a height of at least n
meters]
g
Worlds where the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying lower make less propositions of what is not wanted true
than worldsin which he is ﬂying higher or, equivalently, worlds in which the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying
lower make more propositions of what is not wanted false than worldsin which the jet ﬁghter is
ﬂying higher. With these clariﬁcationsin mind,we might correctly capturetherelevant ordering
source in form of a three place relation among worlds, as in (28).
(28)
8w,w’,w”:w’
￿w w”i f fw’ conforms less than w” to what the pilot does not want in w.
Therefore, a world in which the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying at a height of 60 meters is closer to the ideal
than a world in which the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying with a higher height. Note that the construction
scheme of this ordering source does not follow the usual practice! In the classical version of
Kratzer’s, a world comes closer to an ideal than another world if the ﬁrst makes more proposi-
tionsof theideal truethan thesecond. Kratzer’soriginalorderingsources, we could callpositive
ordering sources.
(29)
8w’,w”
2W and for any A
2 D<s,t>:
w’
￿
+
A w”i f f
fp:p
2 A and w”
2 p
g
￿
fp:p
2 A and w’
2 p
g
In our case, however, a world comes closer to an ordering source than another world if the ﬁrst
makes more propositions of the NOT-ideal false than the second. Such ordering sources, we
may call negative ordering sources.
6Note that the pilotmay have other wishes that are irrelevant for the cruising height of his jet. These wishes do
not count.
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8w’,w”
2W and for any A
2 D<s,t>:
w’
￿-
A w”i f f
fp:p
2 ¯ A and w”
6
2 p
g
￿
fp:p
2 ¯ A and w’
6
2 p
g
The accessibility relation in (25) and the ordering in (28) indeed determine what we want in
order to derive the less-than-minimum reading as represented in (31). Our sentence is true if
the maximal height that the helicopter was ﬂying in the actual world of utterance (@) is below
the maximal height d* such that there is an accessible world w in which the jet ﬁghter is ﬂying
d*-high and that comes closest to the ordering source established in (28).
(31) MAX
fd:H. was ﬂying d-high in @} <
MAX
fd*:
9w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w*
]
& J. is ﬂying d*-high in w
]
g
The set of degrees that fulﬁll the requirements of the standard of comparison, i.e. the second
argument of the comparative, is a singleton. Therefore the following equations are valid, as
shown in (32).
(32) MAX
fd*:
9w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w*
]
& J. is ﬂying d*-high in w
]
g
=M I N
fd*:
9w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w*
]
& J. is ﬂying d*-high in w
]
g
=t h ed*:
9w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w*
]
& J. is ﬂying d*-high in w
]
g
= 60 meters
We may state the following observations: (a) If ordering sources are used to restrict the existen-
tal quantiﬁer over worlds, the maximality operator introduced by the comparative morpheme is
redundant. (b) There is no need for a minimality operator (contra Rullmann). This fact seems
to have been overlooked so far. And (c), the minimality reading is a pragmatic effect of the
interpretation of the modal.
4.2 more/-er + possibility
In much the same way we may derive the more-than-minimum reading for the truck-driver
example, as in (33).
(33) Chuck was driving faster than he is allowed to drive. =(15)
Assume that the modal be allowed to in this example is associated with two contextual param-
eters as follows: (a) the law, i.e., the road trafﬁcregulations for New Jersey, in addition to some
kind of complicated causal law that describes the proportionaldependency of speed and damage
to a truck load, and (b) an ideal, i.e., what Chuck wants, in particular, that he is driving with at
most 35 mph.
(34)
8w: Acc
(w
)
￿
f w
￿ :
8n[Chuck is driving n-fast in w*
) 45mph
￿ n
￿ 60mph
]
g
Furthermore, the ordering source is required to reduce the regulation worlds to worlds where
Chuck is driving slowest (= with a speed of 45 mph). ’What is wanted’ determines the negative
284ordering source in (35).
(35)
8w,w’,w*:w’
￿w w”i f fw’ falsiﬁes more propositions that Chuck does not want in w
than w”.
The ordering source induces a ranking on the worlds that conform to the modal base. The
slower Chuck is driving the less propositions of what he does not want become true. With these
deﬁnitions in mind we state the truth conditions for our sentence as in (36).
(36) MAX
fd:Ch. is driving d-fast in @} > MAX
fd*:
9w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w
]& Ch. is driving d*-fast in w
]
g
Therefore, the set of degrees d such that there is a world that conforms the least well to what
Chuck does not want given the trafﬁc regulations and Chuck is driving d-fast in that world is a
singleton. And, we arrive at the following equivalency for the standard of comparison.
(37) MAX
fd*:
9w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w
]& Ch. is driving d*-fast in w
]
g
=4 5m p h
4.3 More/-er + necessity
By similar reasoning, we may solve the problemsin analyzing themore-than-maximumreading
in constructions with a necessity modal. The key to the solution is an additional condition on
the restriction of the quantiﬁer introduced by the modal. For illustration, consider again the
example with John, the geriatric nurse in (38).
(38) John was more helpful than he should have been. = (17)
Should is a universal quantiﬁer and plausibly associated with a modal base that regulates the
behaviour of the nursing staff in an asylum for the elderly. For simplicity, I assume that help-
fulness is measurable on a scale from 0 to 10. John gets the job if he is helpful to degree 4
or higher and less helpful than 7. Being too helpful could spoil the patients. If the staff is
not helpful enough, the elderly could possibly harm themselves. Under these assumptions, the
accessible worlds may be characterized as in (39).
(39)
8w: Acc
(w
)
￿
f w*:
8n[John is n-helpful in w*
) 4
￿ n
￿ 7
]
g
The ordering source ranks the accessible worlds with respect to their closeness to a personal
ideal of helpfulness. Intuitively, worlds in which John is more helpful come closer to this ideal
than worlds in which he is less helpful. We might express this intuition on the basis of what
John does not want in technical terms as in (40). John does not want to be helpful to a degree
lower than 10.
(40) ¯ A =
fp :
9n
[n<10&p
= John is at most helpful to degree n
]
g
With this NOT-ideal in mind we might express the ordering relation as in (41).
285(41)
8w,w’,w*:w’
￿w w”i f fw’ conforms less than w” to what John does not want in w.
An accessible world is closer to the whishes of John if it falsiﬁes more propositions of (40) than
another accessible world. Therefore, the degree of helpfulness that John has in the accessible
worlds in which he is most helpful determines the standard of comparison. Under this con-
ception, the interpretation of the modal in the than-clause is deﬁned since the ordering source
restricts the worlds that the quantiﬁer operates on to worlds that do not vary with respect to the
helpfulness of John.
(42) MAX
fd : John is d
￿helpful in @
g>
MAX
fd*:
8w
[w
2Acc
(@
) &
:
9w**
[w**
2Acc
(@
) & w**<@w*
]
)John is d*-helpful in w
]
g
The standard of comparison is a maximal possible degree of helpfulness according to the rules.
Note that this reasoning shows that the ordering source may not be omitted in order to make the
correct predictions.
5 Conclusions
I argued that we may derive minimality readings and maximality readings of comparative con-
structions in the classical approach to comparison with a maximality operator if we interpret
the modals that participate in the constructions not only relative to an accessibility relation but
also relative to an ordering source. In order to predict the correct readings, we needed negative
ordering sources. This line of reasoning showed in the ﬁrst place that there is no motivation
for an analysis with a minimality operator. Second, we observed that whenever we interpret the
modals as doubly relative to an accessiblity relation and an ordering source, the maximality op-
erator becomes redundant. And ﬁnally, there seemed to be no need for an at least-interpretation
of the degree variable in order to predict the meaning of constructions with a modal denoting
necessity.
These results suggest that we could make correct predictions for the meaning of comparative
constructions in terms of a comparison of deﬁnite descriptions of degrees. And we are back to
the simple analysis attributed to Russell at least for one group of sentences that motivated the
more complex interpretation with a maximality operator.
An analysis of comparatives in terms of deﬁnite descriptions is, however, difﬁcult to defend.
Ordering sources are contextual parameters and it is not clear, so far, how the accomodation of
asuitableorderingsourceisrestricted. Furthermore,thesimpleaccount requiresthatweanalyze
elements like any, ever and or not in terms of simple existential quantifers but something else.
The most interesting observation concerning these constructions is that they exhibit some kind
of a free choice effect. The relevant constructions have in common that they seem to express
some sort of wide scope universal quantiﬁcation.
(43) a. Jim is taller than Tim or Toby.
b.
8x
[
[x =T i m
_ x = Toby]
) [the d:J i md-big] > [the d: x is d-big]]
(44) a. 2 is greater than any rational lower approximation of
p
2. Pinkal 1989
b.
8x[xis a lower approximationof
p
2
) [the d:2i sd-great]> [the d: x is d-great]]
(45) a. Yesterday, it was hotter than it ever was before.
286b.
8t[t< YESTERDAY
) [the d:i tw a sd-hot yesterday] > [the d:i tw a sd-hot at t]]
There are a couple of promising proposals around in the literature that try to capture this effect
akin to these elements: see Zimmermann 2000 for FC-or, Zepter 2001 for any and ever in
comparatives and most recently Kratzer n.d. for so-called indeterminate pronouns.
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